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outer Continental Shelf. This limited "scope of employment"
addition need not encroach on the adjacent state's jurisdiction.
Non-seamen would receive basically the same coverage if injured
or killed within the state boundaries. Man's exploitation of the
wealth of natural resources off our nation's shores will send ever-
increasing numbers of non-seaman workers into this harsh en-
vironment, and the protection of them and their families should
be of prime importance to our lawmakers.
Ted A. Hodges
UNION USE OF AUTHORIZATION CARDS TO OBTAIN
RECOGNITION UNDER SECTION 8 (A) (5)
Members of Food Stores Employees Union, Local No. 347,
began an organizational drive with a view to election and cer-
tification as the representative of the employees of Gissel Pack-
ing Company as provided in section 9 (c) of the National Labor
Relations Act.1 In the early stages of this effort, the employer
instituted his own vigorous antiunion campaign.2 Nevertheless,
a majority of the employees, 31 of the 47 in the bargaining unit,
signed union authorization cards.3 The company rejected the
demand for recognition and continued its assault by interrogating
employees, assuring higher wages if the company were not
unionized, and warning employees of dire effects if the union
were successful. Subsequently, the union filed unfair labor prac-
tice charges rather than seek an election. The three charges
alleged refusal to bargain,4 coercion of employees, 5 and a viola-
tion of section 8(a) (3)8 due to discharge of union adherents.
After the Board issued a bargaining order and after the Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit refused enforcement, a writ
1. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 9(c), 29 U.S.C.
§ 159(c) (1964).
2. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 580 n.1 (1969). Despite a
company vice-president's warning to two employees that union activity would
result in "you God-damned things" leaving, they attended a union meeting
at which a company agent was present and had their employment termi-
nated shortly thereafter.
3. The authorization cards distributed to the employees unambiguously
authorized the union to represent the signers as exclusive bargaining agent.
This is the single purpose type. The dual-purpose or ambiguous cards, which
the Court does not consider, contain statements that they may be used to
obtain a Board election or that they provide the union representative bar-
gaining status. It, however, does not take a strained reading of the decision
to be warned away from the use of such ambiguous cards.
4. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1964).
5. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) (1964).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1964).
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of certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court. The Court
unanimously held that authorization cards are valid indicators
of employee desires and that a bargaining order is the proper
Board response to an employer's rejection of the card majority
when he also engages in concurrent "less pervasive" unfair labor
practices. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).7
The usual method by which a union achieves status as
exclusive bargaining agent of the employees in the appropriate
unit is through election and certification following the procedures
of the National Labor Relations Act as outlined in section 9 (c),
and this remains the preferred route.8 The ballot election is
governed by an elaborate fabric of law designed to preserve the
secrecy of the employee's choice and to allow him to make an
intelligent, unintimidated choice by hearing employer and union
arguments with opportunity for rebuttals. However, the employer
could, through unfair labor practices, prevent an election from
ever being held and thus prevent unionization by upsetting the
laboratory conditions which the Board considers necessary for
an untrammeled expression of employee choice. An alternate
method, the use of authorization cards, has been frequently in-
voked in recent years where employer conduct has disrupted
the election process. Its legislative support is based on the
Wagner Act which provides that the NLRB may certify unions
on the basis of an election or "any other suitable method" and
the Taft-Hartley amendment which includes the possibility of
union majority representative status under the unfair labor prac-
tice clause of section 8(a) (5).*1 United States Supreme Court
7. Consolidated in this decision are three other cases. Two of them,
Heck's, Inc. and General Bteel Products, Inc., provided in similar, straight-
forward factual settings the same legal problems as does Gissel. The third
case poses several similar legal questions along with an attack on the Board's
factual findings on first amendment grounds. This Note will be restricted to
the issues presented specifically by the GisseZ case.
8. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1964). The Board has always recognized the su-
periority of secret elections. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 596
(1969).
9. National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), 49 Stat. 453 (1935).
10. Admittedly, the Taft-Hartley Act, in section 9(c), contemplates certi-
fication only on the basis of an election by secret ballot, thus deleting "suit-
able methods" from the statutory language, but the re-enacted sections
8(a)(5) and 9(a) retain card majorities as bases for an unfair labor practice
charge levelled against the employer which can result in a Board order to
bargain. It would appear from this that cards could not only support a
section 8(a)(5) charge but also confirmation as a bargaining agent. Serious
argument opposed to this conclusion has been advanced but the practically
universal acceptance of an employer's duty to bargain despite the lack of a
Board election is well established. An example of the arguments may be
found in Comment, 75 YALe L.J. 805, 820-823 (1966). See also Lesnick, Estab-
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interpretation of the legislation has yielded unfailing approval
of the cards with particular reliance placed on Frank Bros. v.
NLRB"1 as the pre-Taft-Hartley statement and more recently on
United Mine Workers v. Arkansas Flooring Co.12 Congressional
anxiety with the Court's reading of the Act has prompted several
bills which would limit the use of authorization cards and require
bargaining only where there has been 9 (c) compliance. Senators
Javits18 and Fannin 1 4 each proposed bills during the 1965 con-
sideration of the repeal of section 14(b) of the NLRA and
lishment of Bargaining Rights Without an NLRB Election, 65 MICH. L. REV.
851, 861-62 (1967).
11. 321 U.S. 702 (1944). See also NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S.
575, 597 (1969).
12. 351 U.S. 62 (1956).
13. S. Bill 2395, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965): "That section 9(c) of the
National Labor Relations Act is amended by adding the following new
paragraph: '(6) In any case in which it is alleged in a petition filed by an
employer pursuant to paragraph (1)(B), that a labor organization seeking
recognition as the representative of the employees of such employer has
presented evidence purporting to show that a majority of the employees In
the appropriate bargaining unit desires to be represented by such labor
organization, it shall be the duty of the Board, if it determines that in all
other respects a question of representation affecting commerce exists, to
forthwith, without regard to the provisions of paragraph (1), direct the hold-
ing of such an election In such a unit as the Board finds to be appropriate
and to certify the results thereof. The consideration of the petition and the
holding of the election, In any such case, shall not be delayed by reason of
the pendency of an unfair labor practice charge based upon the refusal of
the employer to bargain collectively with the labor organization, and no
such unfair labor practice charge based upon a refusal to bargain prior to
the election shall thereafter be considered unless the Board determines
that the labor organization had once been authorized to represent a ma-
jority of the employees in the bargaining unit, but that as a result of unfair
labor practices committed by the employer (other than unfair labor practices
under section 8(a)(5)), (a) such labor organization is no longer authorized
to represent such majority or (b) the conditions required for the holding
of a fair election no longer exist.'"
14. S. Bill 2226, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965): "That section 9(a) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, is amended by inserting before
the first proviso therein the following: 'Provided further, That such bargain-
ing representatives shall have been certified by the Board as the result of an
election conducted in accordance with section 9(c), unless the employer shall
have engaged in a course of conduct in violation of section 8 with intent
to undermine a majority secured without coercion or misrepresentation by
the labor organization or organizations seeking recognition in accordance
with section 9(c).'
"See. 2. Section 10(c) of such Act is amended by inserting before the
period at the end of the third sentence thereof a colon and the following:
'Provided further, That the Board shall not issue an order to bargain in any
case in which the bargaining representative shall not have been certified as
a result of an election conducted in accordance with section 9(c), unless the
employer shall have engaged In violation of section 8 with intent to under-
mine a majority secured without coercion or misrepresentation by the labor
organization or organizations seeking recognition in accordance with section
9(c).' "
NOTES
Senator Javits along with Senator Thurmond offered an amend-
ment to section 9(a) in January 1969.15
There has arisen a dispute among the circuits on the inherent
reliability of these cards as adequate manifestations of employees'
wishes. This turmoil is best seen through the following history.
The landmark case of Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. NLRB l 6 an-
nounced a basic standard of good faith for determining whether
a bargaining order could issue on the basis of authorization
cards. The traditional Board approach was that an employer
must bargain with the union demanding recognition, based upon
its claim that a majority of his employees have signed author-
ization cards, unless he entertains a good faith doubt as to the
union's majority status. Once a majority is demonstrated, the
Joy Silk formula, on this point, has been universally accepted.
Obvious lack of good faith doubt on the part of an employer
might be illustrated by unfair labor practices17 or refusal to
bargain merely to gain time to undercut a union majority. 8
However, the Board and the courts have warned that not every
independent unfair labor practice will trigger a bargaining
order-thus refusing per se application of Joy Silk.19
15. S. Bill 426, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969): "Be it enacted by the Senate
and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress
assembled, That section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended
(29 U.S.C. 159(a)), is amended by inserting before the first proviso therein
the following: 'Provided further, That such bargaining representation shall
have been certified by the Board as the result of an election conducted in
accordance with subsection (c).'
"Sec. 2. Section 10(c) of such Act (29 U.S.C. 160(c)) is amended by In-
serting before the period at the end of the third sentence thereof a colon
and the following: 'Provided further, That the Board shall not issue an order
to bargain in any case in which the bargaining representative shall not have
been certified as a result of an election conducted in accordance with section
9(c).'
"Sec. 3. The amendments made by this Act shall not be construed to
require the holding of an election in any case in which an employer is re-
quired to recognize and bargain with a labor organization pursuant to a
valid existing bargaining order entered by the National Labor Relations
Board prior to the date of enactment of this Act, or in any case In which
on such date an employer is voluntarily recognizing and bargaining with a
labor organization and a question concerning representation may not ap-
propriately be raised under section 9(c) of this Act."
16. 85 N.L.R.B. 1263 (1949), enf'd, 185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. de-
nied, 341 U.S. 914 (1951).
17. NLRB v. Southland Paint Co., 157 N.L.R.B. 795 (1966), enforcement
denied, 394 F.2d 717 (5th Cir. 1968).
18. See Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America (Hamburg Shirt
Corp.) v. NLRB, 156 N.L.R.B. 511 (1965), enf'd, 371 F.2d 740, 743 (D.C. Cir.
1966); Byrne Dairy, Inc., 176 N.L.R.B. 40 (1969).
19. Hammond & Irving, Inc., 154 N.L.R.B. 1071 (1965). See Comment,
Union Authorization Cards, 75 YALE L.J. 805, 813 (1966).
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Bad faith may also be proved by a showing that at the time
of demand the employer could have had no bona fide doubt
about the union's status even though he is guilty of no indepen-
dent unfair practices. The leading case propounding this view
is Snow & Sons v. NLRB, which held that the employer had no
supportable doubt with respect to the union's majority-a rejec-
tion of the collective bargaining concept:
"The manner in which an employer receives reliable infor-
mation of union representation . . . is of no consequence.
Once he has received such information . .. , insistence upon
a Board election can no longer be defended on the grounds
of a genuine doubt as to majority representation." 20
Recently the Board distinguished Snow & Sons in John P. Serpa,
Inc.21 and refused strict adherence to card checks in the absence
of other objective considerations.
The only notable abridgement of Joy Silk22 is the limitation
announced in Aaron Bros. v. NLRB.2' There the Board imposed
the duty on the General Counsel to prove the employer's bad
faith. This has not lightened the burden of the employer who
still must justify his doubt about the union's majority once any
of the acts which give rise to a presumption of bad faith have
20. Snow & Sons v. NLRB, 134 N.L.R.B. 709 (1961), enfd, 308 F.2d 687,
692 (9th Cir. 1962). In Snow, a minister conducted the card check, checking
the signatures against payroll forms and tallying the result. If an employer
card check has been taken, and a majority found, the standard of good faith
is difficult to meet. Recent expression of this policy is found in NLRB v.
C & C Packing Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 669 (1967), enfd, 405 F.2d 935, 936 (9th Cir.
1969), wherein a retired mediator, Halloran, was chosen to conduct the check.
A union majority, 15 out of the 22 employees in the unit, was found and
"[t]he Company did not challenge nor question this card-check procedure
when Halloran asked both sides if there were any problems or challenges."
In several meetings which followed, no objection was made to the check
but, subsequent to a union bargain demand, the company disputed the relia-
bility of the card-check, arguing that it had a good faith doubt as to the
union majority status. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the com-
pany's contention, noting a similarity with Snow and granted enforcement
of the Board's bargaining order.
21. 155 N.L.R.B. 99 (1965), reversed and remanded, sub. nom., Retail
Clerks Union v. NLRB, 376 F.2d 186 (9th Cir. 1967). The court noted that the
employer was entitled to consult an attorney concerning the legal significance
of the cards but he was obliged to contact the union as soon as possible
after this consultation.
22. 85 N.L.R.B. 1263 (1949), enfd, 185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied,
341 U.S. 914 (1951).
23. 158 N.L.R.B. 1077 (1966).
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been supported by the evidence. The burden which is then shifted
to the employer is one which few have found sustainable.2 4
The circuits have accepted the Joy Silk doctrine and the
Aaron Bros. limitation, but the related rule on the specific ques-
tion of reliability of authorization cards, as set forth in NLRB v.
Cumberland Shoe Corp.,25 has caused a marked split in circuit
court decisions. In Cumberland Shoe, the Board ruled that an
unambiguous card-one which clearly states that the signer
names the union as his bargaining agent without the necessity
of an election-is valid, even though union organizers suggested
that the card would be used to obtain an election. The cards
could be excluded if these oral misrepresentations were to the
effect that the card's sole or only purpose was for an election.
Heated criticism of this rule has been voiced in academic circles26
and some federal circuits. Several circuits, holding that the sub-
jective intent of the signer must be probed, have voided cards
and refused to enforce Board orders rather than apply the
Cumberland test.27 NLRB v. S. S. Logan Packing Co.2 8 and
NLRB v. Sehon Stevenson & Co. 29 placed the Fourth Circuit
firmly in opposition to authorization cards as dependable indices
and even suggested that union use of such cards gave the em-
ployer an automatic good faith doubt under section 8(a) (5).
The subjective intent doctrine also found adherents in the Fifth
Circuit; that court was prompted to write in Engineers &
Fabricators Inc. v. NLRB:
24. Welles, The Obligation to Bargain on the Basis of a Card Majority,
3 GA. L. REsv. 349, 350 (1969), takes an apparently more moderate approach
to this Board reversal. He writes: "Thus the employer need not express, or
possess, objective or subjective reasons for his doubts .... [H]owever, the
employer must express his doubt in response to the request. He cannot ...
merely refuse to bargain without giving any reason and then assert good
faith doubt when charged with a violation of section 8(a)(5)."
25. 144 N.L.R.B. 1268 (1964), enf'd, 351 F.2d 917 (6th Cir. 1965).
26. A sampling .of the academic disapproval can be found in the following
articles: Comment, Refusal-to-Recognize Charges Under Section 8(a)(5) of
the NLRA: Card Checks and Employee Free Choice, 33 U. CH. L. Rav. 387,
396 (1966); Lewis, The Use and Abuse of Authorization Cards in Determining
Union Majority, 16 IB. L.J. 434, 440 (1965); Note, Union Authorization Cards,
75 YALE L.J. 805 (1966). This last article recites: "Authorization cards are
an unreliable index of employee choice. Compared with the secret ballot
they replace, their solicitation is a woefully defective process, guaranteeing
to employees neither a free nor a reasoned choice .... And even when the
employer does illegally interfere with free choice, authorization cards are
so unreliable that a rerun election-or two, or three, or ten-better protects
employee freedom." Id. at 818.
27. See NLRB v. Southland Paint Co., Inc. 394 F.2d 717 (5th Cir. 1968).
28. 386 F.2d 562 (4th Cir. 1967).
29. 386 F.2d 551 (4th Cir. 1967).
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"When cards are challenged because of alleged misrepre-
sentations in their procurement, the general counsel must
show that the subjective intent to authorize union represen-
tation was not vitiated by such representations. Here the
Board did not apply this legal standard. . . .The point is
that the Board applied the facts to the wrong legal standard
because there was no probing into the subjective intent of
the challenged signer."80
The Second and Eighth Circuits join the Fourth and the Fifth
in their distrust of authorization cards and demand a study of
the signer's intrapsychic processes.8' There is, however, an im-
pressive array of decisions supporting the Cumberland Shoe rule.
Indicative of these was the statement by the District of Columbia
Circuit Court in UAW v. NLRB: "This Court has consistently
upheld the rule, announced by the Board in NLRB v. Cumber-
land Shoe Corp., that 'where the cards are unambiguous on their
face, unless employees were told that an election was the only
purpose of the cards, the employees would be held to the terms
of the cards which they had signed.... Once again, we approve
the Board's use of that rule.' "82 The circuits have enforced or
refused to enforce Board orders which involved the dispute over
authorization cards as their acceptance or rejection of the Cum-
berland Shoe rule dictated.83 The Board supplied its own warn-
ing in NLRB v. Levi Strauss & Co.8 4 against an overly mechanical
application of Cumberland. Trial examiners were cautioned to
look to substance rather than to form: "[i]t is not the use or
nonuse of certain key or 'magic' words that is controlling, but
whether or not the totality of circumstances surrounding the
card solicitation is such, as to add up to an assurance to the card
signer that his card will be used for no purpose other than to
help get an election."3
In reconciling the differences between the circuits, Gissel
supplies ample guidelines instructing the employer on the proper
attitude he should take when confronted with a union demand
30. Engineers & Fabricators, Inc. v. NLRB, 376 F.2d 482, 487 (5th Cir.
1967).
31. Id. See also NLRB v. Southland Paint Co., Inc., 394 F.2d 717, 730 (5th
Cir. 1968).
32. 392 F.2d 801, 807 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
33. Browne, Some Thoughts on the Board's "Decision" in Levi Strauss,
or New Straws in Support of Cumberland Shoe, 3 GA. L. Rsv. 334 (1969).
34. 172 N.L.R.B. 57 (1968).
35. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 608 n.27 (1969).
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for recognition and an offer to prove majority status with author-
ization cards. 8 The Court narrowly restricts its holding to un-
ambiguous cards solicited in an atmosphere "where a fair election
probably could not have been held."87
Each employer confronted with a recognition demand should
consider several questions before deciding his course of action.
The paramount questions are whether authorization cards may
serve as conclusive evidence of employee choice and what con-
temporaneous independent activity will constitute an unfair labor
practice and thus sustain a bargaining order. The employer
knows that he is not allowed to recognize a minority union and
that he may not take the union's word on the determination of
its majority status without running afoul of the NLRA. Two
other questions foremost in his mind are: May the employer
entertain a good faith doubt as to the majority status claimed
through possession of authorization cards? May the employer
refuse to look at the cards, demand a Board-conducted election
and insure himself of the industrial peace which comes of sec-
tion 9(c),88 or request the union to seek an election?
Chief Justice Warren, writing for a unanimous Court, de-
nies the charge of inherent unreliability of authorization cards, 9
strongly supports their use, and conceives of a situation in which
even the preferred route of section 9(c) would probably not
afford employees an effective opportunity to demonstrate their
choice. Under well-settled Board policy and circuit court de-
cisions, bargaining orders issue in instances growing out of
substantial "outrageous" unfair labor practices without need of
inquiry into majority status, and this policy is approved by the
Court.4 The effect of the Gissel holding, specifically directed at
"less pervasive practices which nonetheless still have the ten-
dency to undermine majority strength,' 4 1 is to permit the Board
to order the employer to bargain, where the effects of these prac-
tices are not likely to be erased, where they have obstructed
36. Welles, The Obligation to Bargain on the Basis of a Card Majority,
3 GA. L. Rzv. 349 (1969), deals with the obligation of an employer to bargain
with a union which has based its claim as exclusive representative on a
majority of signed authorization cards.
37. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 601 n.18 (1969).
38. Id. at 599 n.14.
39. "We therefore reject any rule that requires a probe of an employee's
subjective motivations as involving an endless and unreliable inquiry." Id.
at 608.
40. NLRB v. S. S. Logan Packing Co., 386 F.2d 562, 570-71 (4th Cir. 1967).
41. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 614 (1969).
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a fair election, and where employee majority sentiment, once
witnessed by the cards, would be better protected.42
The employer cannot take the union's word that it does
have a majority in the appropriate unit;48 he may insist on a
card check or conduct a poll of the employees. The poll must
be executed with care because it must stay within the employee
safeguards established in NLRB v. Struksnes Constr. Co.44 If an
actual majority is discovered, or if there was already independent
knowledge of the majority status, the employer is not entitled
to stall in an attempt to dissipate that majority but must bargain
according to section 8(a) (5).
Inactivity might be the proper tactic since "an employer is
not obligated to accept a card check ... and he is not required
to justify his insistence on an election by making his own inves-
tigation of employee sentiment and showing affirmative reasons
for doubting the majority status."'4 5 Should the employer opt for
this maneuver, he may decline the union's request and insist on
an election, either by filing for it himself4" or urging the union
to do so. 47 The employer may also discredit the authorization
cards if he is able to show that supervisors participated in their
solicitation,48 or that the cards were results of coercion, or that
union adherents clearly directed the signer to disregard the lan-
guage of the card.49 Approval of the Cumberland Shoe rule re-
42. There is a third category of practices, though unfair, which have
minimal consequences and will not cause the Board to issue an order. Id. at
615.
43. NLRB v. World Carpets of New York, Inc., 403 F.2d 408, 411 (2d
Cir. 1968).
44. 165 N.L.R.B. 102, 65 L.R.R.M. 1385, 1386 (1967). The Board, in re-
sponse to a remand from the District of Columbia Circuit, stated the con-
siderations on which polling will be resolved by the Board in future cases:
"Absent unusual circumstances, the polling of employees by an employer
will be violative of section 8(a)(1) of the Act unless the following safeguards
are observed: (1) the purpose of the poll is to determine the truth of a
union's claim of majority, (2) this purpose is communicated to the em-
ployees, (3) assurances against reprisals are given, (4) the employees are
polled by secret ballot, and (5) the employer has not engaged in unfair labor
practices or otherwise created a coercive atmosphere."
45. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 609 (1969).
46. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(B) (1964).
47. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 599 (1969). The certified
union has special privileges from which the employer may also benefit:
under § 9(c)(3), the company premises will be safe from another election
campaign for twelve months in which a rival union seeks to decertify the
union; a reasonable time of protection against any disruption because of
claims that the union no longer represents a majority; and the protection
against recognition picketing by rival unions. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(C) (1964).
48. NLRB v. Hawthorne Aviation, 406 F.2d 428 (10th Cir. 1969).
49. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 606 (1969): "In resolving
the conflict among the circuits in favor of approving the Board's Cumberland
NOTES
sults in not requiring a probe into the subjective motivation of
the employee; endorsement of the caveat of Levi Strauss allows
the Board discretion in fashioning a remedy ensuring employee
free choice.
On the question of employer good faith the Court states that
it is not faced "with a situation where an employer, with 'good'
or 'bad' subjective motivation ... has insisted... that the union
go to an election while at the same time refraining from com-
mitting unfair labor practices."5 0 Though the Court writes that
its decision is not keyed to the problem of good faith the em-
ployer might still read Gissel to assist him in discovering the
proper course of action. The employer who has a good faith
doubt as to the union's majority status and refrains from any
unfair labor practices may insist on an election with no affir-
mative reasons for rejection of the recognition request. This is
well within the Gissel holding because, in that instance, no un-
fair labor practices are committed. But if the employer knows
from personal sources that the union has a majority and even
though he does not commit any contemporaneous unfair prac-
tices, a Board order to bargain could still be supported on the
grounds that the Joy Silk good faith test had not been met. This
seems to be the only residual validity of the Joy Silk doctrine:
"[U]nder the Board's current practice, an employer's good faith
doubt is largely irrelevant, and the key to the issuance of a bar-
gaining order is the commission of serious unfair labor practices
that interfere with the election processes."5' 1
The straightforward stand taken in Gissel in approving the
use of authorization cards acknowledges an impressive line of
decisions beginning with Frank Bros. The Gissel case disposes
of the scholarly objections by correctly construing the intent
of Congress when it drafted the Taft-Hartley Act and retained
what are now sections 8 (a) (5) and 9 (a). No longer, it is to be
hoped, will the disparateness appear between the circuits penal-
izing some and rewarding others, depending upon the district
in which the request for enforcement was brought. In adopting
rule, we think it sufficient to point out that employees should be bound by
the clear language of what they sign unless that language is deliberately
and clearly cancelled by a union adherent with words calculated to direct
the signer to disregard and forget the language above his signature. There
is nothing inconsistent in handing an employee a card that says the signer
authorizes the union to represent him and then telling him that the card
will probably be used first to get an election."
50. Id. at 601 n.18.
51. Id. at 594.
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the oft-quoted Cumberland Shoe rule and the caveat of Levi
Strauss prohibiting subjective probings, the Court no doubt
hopes to prevent continued judicial disagreements in this area.
In ratifying the Board's limitation of Joy Silk, the Court has
taken the necessary action to provide more objective standards
by which employer interference may be tested. Continued sup-
port of the Board's authority to issue bargaining orders is but
the natural and necessary outgrowth of the Court's recognition
that the disruption of election conditions must be remedied and
the violations discouraged. 52 The Supreme Court has attempted
in an exceptionally well-reasoned decision not only to calm the
waters which have been troubled so often but also to obviate
congressional response to the furor by deciding the issue in a
manner assuring employees greater freedom in choosing to
organize or not, the express purpose of the NLRA. 3 Recent
decisions in the various circuits and by the Board indicate suc-
cess in this attempt by the Supreme Court.5 4
Howard S. Linzy
52. The Board has also recognized the viability of Joy Silk in the case
of an employer's refusal to recognize the union on the grounds of doubt as
to the appropriateness of the unit and his later claim that he doubted the
union's majority status. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575. 594
(1969).
53. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
54. E.g., NLRB v. American Cable Systems, Inc., 414 F.2d 661 (10th Cir.
1969); Food Store Employees v. NLRB, 413 F.2d 407 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Nash-
Finch Co., 178 N.L.R.B. 77 (1969); General Stencils, Inc., 178 N.IL.R.B. 18
(1969).
[Vol. 30
